

Week 3

Plan:

1. Preliminaries.

Three distinctions:

- a) “The notorious ‘ing’/‘ed’ (‘able’) distinction.”
- b) Particulars/facts (referrable by singular terms vs. storable by declarative sentences).
- c) Epistemic-justificatory (normative) vs. causal-dispositional (alethic modal).

2. Givenness (a myth).

- a) An inconsistent triad.
- b) Diagnosis: Running together two good lines of thought.
- c) Diagram:
Visible world → Sensings of Sense Contents → Noninferential Beliefs → Inferential Beliefs
- d) Givenness in general: The idea that there can be any state or episode that has epistemic evidential or justificatory significance that does not presuppose conceptual capacities that come with language.

3. Appearance/Reality (‘looks Φ ’-talk and ‘is Φ ’-talk).

- a) Descartes’s reification and epistemological privileging of appearances (appearings).
- b) Parable of the tie shop, and its lesson about what one is *doing* in saying how things merely look: withholding endorsement.
- c) Two confirmations of Sellars’s account: merely generic lookings (many-sided) and scoped lookings.
- d) Epistemological lesson: ‘looks Φ ’-talk is pragmatically, and so semantically dependent on (presupposes) ‘is Φ ’-talk. Conclusion: knowledge of appearances cannot serve as an epistemological foundation (regress-stopper w/res to justification).
- e) From perception to agency: analogical argument for language-exit transitions and volitions as minimal safe doings.

4. Epistemology of observation reports. The role of reliability.

- a) Sellars’s justificatory internalism. Must not only be reliable, but know that one is.
- b) Reliabilism as justificatory externalism. Reliability is enough for justification.
- c) A social *via media*. Attributor of knowledge endorses reliability inference.

5. Acquiring concepts. Coming into the language.

- a) Paradox of sapient awareness presupposing concept-acquisition, not explaining it.
- b) Social functionalism.